The Halo Effect (and no I’m not talking about the video game)

I just finished reading The Halo Effect by Phil Rosenzweig, and found it to be a particularly practical, candid, and insightful read. Rosenzweig’s book revolves around the concept of the “halo effect” which is defined as “a flawed psychological disposition that causes individuals, generally incorrectly, to align their thinking and evaluations of others across all dimensions based on knowledge of a single dimension”. In English, that means company performance sometimes creates a “halo” that shapes the way we perceive strategy, leadership, people, culture, more. When a company’s sales/profits are up we tend to claim it’s because of a brilliant strategy or a visionary leader. When that same company’s performance falters though, we conclude that the strategy was misaligned or the leader was unfit for the job. As a business student, this is a painfully accurate description of how we are often taught to think.
Rosenzweig cites several real life examples, but I really enjoyed his discussion of Wal-Mart because it was one of our case studies in my management class this past year. We were always discussing Wal-Mart’s “cost leadership” strategy and the company’s sophisticated use of technology, but we never really considered how the corporation grew large enough to have such low margins in the first place. Often a company’s “current” strategy evolves through a strange combination of decisions and luck, and it is difficult to look back and separate the two. Rosenzweig recognizes this fact, and comments that the “link between the inputs and outputs is tenuous”.
I was also fascinated by Rosenzweig’s insight into the ephemeral nature of success. This is one that it seems almost everyone struggles with. It was amazing to read about all the studies that considered “best in class” companies for a given time period and proclaimed that if others followed the examples set by the “best in class” they would be successful too- and then a few years later those “best in class” were under performing the market. Oops.
One of my projects this summer was an extensive M&A Mega-deals Analysis (we defined a mega-deal to be one in which the target was worth over $10 billion). As suspected, a year after the announcement date the majority of the deals resulted in value destruction and on average the deals consistently resulted in negative returns. We explored further and took a look at practical and strategic characteristics of the deals that might help explain the poor performance, such as price bidding, how integration was handled, cost synergies, macro-economic factors, timing, etc. While we did find that unsuccessful buyers and targets often grossly overestimated cost savings, underestimated merger expenses, and didn’t consider the full range of integration issues they might run into (technological, managerial, cultural, etc), even the few deals that outperformed the market usually did so only because of economic factors beyond their control. Basically we found it was often better “to be lucky than good” because even if the buyer and target considered all of the criteria we defined in our framework, it still didn’t guarantee success- and, like Rosenzweig points out, even when companies are successful it is often short lived.
Throughout the book Rosenzweig also describes eight other business delusions. One of my other favorites was “Delusion of Single Explanations”: many studies show that a particular factor, such as corporate culture or social responsibility, leads to improved performance. But since many of these types of factors are highly correlated, the effect of each one is usually less that suggested. This is a huge problem with research because even if the data is perfect, it is very very difficult to differentiate between the effects of several related elements. I think that even recognition of this fact is useful though, and an important clarification to make in reporting results. All too often we confuse correlation with causation or put more emphasis on a single factor than is necessary.
These were just a few points in the book that really caught my attention. In general it was a great read, though a bit repetitive at times. I guess as a student my “concern” is that while I understand what Rozenzweig is saying and though I’ve always agreed that copy cat cultures and celebrity CEO’s don’t work, how do you figure out how to run a company if you can’t really look to best in class and figure out what they did right and go with that? Rosenzweig talks about how chance plays a greater part than we think and yet the best managers act as if chance is irrelevant. I’ve written previously about how important luck is, although the best entrepreneurs are sometimes able to “create luck”. Either way, it’s pretty scary knowing that there’s only so much you can control.
I think more so with business than with many other disciplines there is really only so much you can learn in the classroom, because there aren’t laws and rules like in science and English. I think in business, experience is the only real credential that matters. So no, I’m not suggesting all of us business students drop out, but rather that field work, shadowing executives, and other forms of experiential learning are critical, and that no matter what you do and don’t learn you have to be willing to take some risks.
If any b-school kids are reading this (and everyone else too of course), you should take a break from Halo 3 and check out The Halo Effect.











